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MODEL LANGUAGE FOR  
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING STATUTES 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 16.1 million Americans over fifteen years old had a 
“reported mental, cognitive, or emotional disability” in 2005,1 and nearly 
50 million Americans are affected by neurodegenerative conditions each 
year.2 Such disabilities can lead courts to determine that these individuals 
are incompetent—incapable of managing their own affairs.3 When such a 
determination is made, the Western legal tradition imposes an obligation on 
the State as parens patriae, or “parent of the country,” to protect that person 
and their property.4 In practice, the State often imposes guardianship on 
people whose disabilities interfere with their decision-making ability, 
thereby entrusting another person with decision-making on their behalf.5 
People with disabilities, activists, and scholars have critiqued the 
guardianship system for not doing enough to investigate the actual 
limitations of those subjected to guardianship and for denying too many of 
their rights.6 As respected jurist Judge Cardozo wrote, “[e]very human being 
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body.”7 Guardianship exposes the tension between protecting 
an individual’s best interests (from the view of the State) and recognizing 
the right to self-determination and decision-making.  
Supported decision-making offers a different approach to balancing the 
rights of the individual with the State’s obligation to protect people with 
disabilities. Put simply, the person with a disability retains decision-making 
authority over their own life and receives any necessary decision-making 
 
1. Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a 
Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 157, 166 n.24 (2010). This number is expected to increase with the growing number of older adults. 
Id. 
2. Jalayne J. Arias, A Time to Step In: Legal Mechanisms for Protecting Those with Declining 
Capacity, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 134, 138 (2013). 
3. See infra Part I.B. 
4. Salzman, supra note 1, at 164. 
5. See infra Part II.A, for a discussion of guardianships. It may be more accurate to refer to 
substituted decision-making instead of the narrower category “guardianships” because some states 
distinguish between guardians and conservators based on whether the person has authority over lifestyle 
or financial decisions. However, this Note will primarily rely on the more common terminology of 
guardianship. 
6. See infra Part II.A. Broadly speaking, the “right” at issue is the right to make decisions about 
one’s life; this implicates many areas of life, including the right to marry or dissolve a marriage, to work, 
to select housing, to consent to medical treatment, and to invest or gift money, among other decisions. 
See infra note 60. 
7. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 











assistance from others per a voluntary agreement.8 While advocates initially 
promoted the model primarily for use by people with intellectual or 
psychosocial disabilities,9 there has been a trend to extend its use to other 
groups, such as older persons10 and people with dementia.11 
In light of the growing interest in supported decision-making, this Note 
examines existing supported decision-making statutes to propose model 
language that best serves people with disabilities. Part I of this Note 
provides a brief introduction to medical and legal determinations of capacity 
or competency. These concepts are necessary to understand the 
circumstances in which guardianship and supported decision-making 
agreements apply. Part II of this Note then explores the use and history of 
substituted decision-making, specifically guardianship, and the subsequent 
development of supported decision-making as an alternative. Part III delves 
into an analysis of existing statutes on supported decision-making, 
considering how each answers several key questions: What is required of 
the principal to enter a supported decision-making agreement? How does 
supported decision-making relate to guardianship? What is required of the 
supporter? And finally, what is the role of the State? Part IV takes up these 
questions again, but this time proposes model statutory language to suggest 
how legislatures should answer them to better serve people with disabilities. 
I. DETERMINING MEDICAL CAPACITY AND LEGAL COMPETENCY 
For the purpose of this Note, capacity will be treated as a medical 
determination and competency as a legal one; in reality, the terms are often 
used interchangeably. As a medical determination, “capacity” is found by 
physicians and psychiatrists12 and is best understood as existing on a 
continuum13—capacity can range from high to average to low and may vary 
based on context. “Competency,” however, is a legal determination often 
made by probate courts14 and exists as a binary15—a person is either 
competent or incompetent. Judges, then, must decide at which point on the 
 
8. Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy, and Supported Healthcare Decisionmaking, 79 MD. 
L. REV. 257, 262 (2020). The use of a formalized agreement is relatively new, but informal supported 
decision-making is as old as decision-making itself. Anyone who has ever asked another person to 
explain a problem or possible solution, to assist in weighing the options, or to communicate a decision 
to others has engaged in supported decision-making. Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including 
Older Persons in the Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 43 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 495, 516 (2016). 
9. Diller, supra note 8, at 520. 
10. Id. at 524. 
11. Wright, supra note 8, at 284. 
12. Arias, supra note 2, at 136. 
13. Id. at 137. 
14. Id. at 136. 












capacity continuum an individual moves from competent to incompetent.16 
As will be seen, both determinations have tremendous implications for 
individual rights, and the methods by which these determinations are made 
are subject to strong criticism.17 
A. Medical Determinations of Mental Capacity 
Individuals use a variety of skills to manage their affairs, and these 
skills—including “memory, reasoning, judgment, and decision making”—
collectively form mental capacity.18 Capacity exists on a “continuum” as it 
may vary across skills and over time.19 Adults are assumed to have 
capacity,20 so physicians are unlikely to evaluate an individual’s level of 
capacity “without cause.”21 When an evaluation is considered necessary, it 
generally focuses on the individual’s capacity to make a specific decision 
or perform a specific action.22 Although evaluations vary, four criteria are 
commonly considered:23 
1. The ability to “maintain and communicate a choice or decision,”24 
2. The ability to “understand relevant information,” including the ability 
“to recall the information” and “to comprehend the meaning of the 
information provided,”25 
3. The ability to “appreciate his or her situation,” in that the individual 




17. See infra Part II. 
18. Melanie Gavisk & Edith Greene, Guardianship Determinations by Judges, Attorneys, and 
Guardians, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 339, 339–40 (2007). 
19. Arias, supra note 2, at 138 (quoting Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity 
in Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 93 (2008)). 
20. Id. at 139.  
21. Id. at 142. What constitutes “cause?” Typically the physician is considering this question in 
the healthcare setting, so their goal is to establish that a patient is capable of giving informed consent 
(e.g. to a recommended procedure or medication). “[C]ommon law presumes competency, which means 
testing for capacity to satisfy informed consent is not so much a legal as an ethical requirement.” Lauren 
Padama, Note, Informed Consent and Decision-Making After Loss of Competency in Dementia Patients: 
A New Model, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 173, 181 (2018). If a patient agrees with their doctor, the 
doctor is unlikely to call into question the patient’s decision making capacity; if the patient does not, 
however, then the doctor may investigate if the patient lacks capacity, which would put the decision in 
the hands of the physician or another substituted decision-maker. Wright, supra note 8, at 311. 
22. See Arias, supra note 2, at 142.  
23. Id. at 142–43. Also known as the Appelbaum-Grisso criteria, these conditions of capacity 
stem from legal standards. Id.; see also Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in 
Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 93 (2008) (framing the standards as 
“understanding, appreciation, choice and reasoning”). 
24. Arias, supra note 2, at 143. Communication of one’s choice is “almost a universally accepted 
component of capacity.” Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 143–44. 











4. The ability to apply the individual’s own values to the information 
provided in reaching a decision, called “[r]ational manipulation.”27 
Researchers consider capacity to be “a domain-specific and risk-
sensitive concept.”28 Domain-specific means capacity can vary across 
different decisions or actions,29 so an evaluation must consider the types and 
level of skills needed for the decision or action being assessed.30 For 
example, the abilities necessary to drive a car safely to a familiar destination 
are different than the abilities necessary to plan a budget, so an individual 
may have capacity in one domain and not the other. Risk-sensitive means 
that “the threshold for capacity should be adjusted to the risk-benefit profile 
of the decision.”31 For example, driving a car and driving a riding 
lawnmower require a similar set of skills, but the risks involved are 
different. To the extent that driving a car is higher risk because it involves 
greater speeds and more interactions with other drivers, it requires a higher 
degree of capacity.32 
Capacity evaluations face a number of criticisms. The most significant 
is that “clinical judgments of capacity can often be inaccurate, unreliable, 
and even invalid.”33 So far there is no consensus on what criteria to evaluate 
to determine capacity,34 so assessment tools themselves differ and cannot 
be validated.35 Different doctors using the same assessment tools, or the 
same doctor using different assessment tools, may reach different 
conclusions regarding an individual’s capacity, particularly with regard to 
 
27. Id. at 144. This is the most controversial criterion because there is “a risk of abuse by 
evaluators making determinations based on the unconventional nature of a person’s choices, instead of 
the inability to reason.” Id. 
28. Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Preservation of the Capacity to Appoint a Proxy Decision Maker: 
Implications for Dementia Research, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 214, 214 (2011). 
29. See id. at 215. 
30. Arias, supra note 2, at 140. 
31. Kim, supra note 28, at 215.  
32. Judges have also recognized this distinction in risk levels in determining if a party had 
capacity to take certain legal actions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Greenway, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 372–
74 (Ct. App. 2013) (“the determination of a person’s mental capacity is fact specific, and the level of 
required mental capacity changes depending on the issue at hand. . . . Simply stated, the required level 
of understanding depends entirely on the complexity of the decision being made.”). 
33. Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older 
Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62 J. GERONTOLOGY 3, 9 (2007). 
34. For example, the emphasis on communication abilities may fail to account for the ways a 
patient’s emotional responses to the medical evaluation process (such as fear or frustration) may 
influence behavior (e.g. cause someone to refuse to answer questions). Evaluators may mistakenly 
attribute that behavior to incapacity. See Wright, supra note 8, at 269 n.61. 
35. Arias, supra note 2, at 146. Part of the challenge of creating a universal tool or set of tools is 
that, as discussed, different skills are needed “to maintain capacity for purposes of medical, lifestyle, 
legal, or financial decision-making.” Id. at 140. The tool(s) used will have to take these differences into 
account. Part of the challenge is also pragmatic: “[f]ewer tools have been developed to address capacity 
in the context of everyday or financial decision-making.” Id. at 146. This is largely because these areas 












appreciation and reasoning.36 The choice of competency assessment or 
doctor may therefore be the true determinative factor in an evaluation’s 
outcome.37 In addition, “it is not at all clear that persons with typical 
decision-making abilities and no disabilities would be found to have 
capacity if formally evaluated,”38 which further undermines the legitimacy 
of restricting an individual’s rights based on such an evaluation.39 Finally, 
despite the decision-specific nature of capacity assessments, the tests do not 
always account for the context of the actual decisions, which means that 
these tests may not make an accurate prediction of decision-making capacity 
in real-life situations.40  
To the extent these assessments provide at least some basis for 
determining capacity, it is of additional concern that clinicians do not 
always engage in a formal evaluation to make a finding of incapacity before 
removing a patient’s decision-making authority.41 Instead, these clinicians 
base their decision on “history, diagnosis, disability, age, appearance, 
behaviour or the fact that someone was making an unwise decision.”42 For 
example, doctors have presumed that dementia patients are incapacitated 
after conducting only an informal assessment or no assessment at all.43 If a 
physician reaches a finding of incapacity, they may turn to other sources 
(such as an advance directive or surrogate decision-maker) for medical 
decisions.44 A finding of incapacity can also be used to inform a legal 
determination of incompetency. 
B. Legal Determinations of Competency 
Incompetency is usually determined after a family member, friend, or 
agency files a guardianship petition following some event that suggests a 
potential need for guardianship, such as “an acute illness, financial 
mismanagement, or institutional placement.”45 Physicians or mental health 
 
36. Moye & Marson, supra note 33, at 7. 
37. Padama, supra note 21, at 187.  
38. Wright, supra note 8, at 269 n.61. For example, one study found that “almost the entire 
healthy sample satisf[ied] the elements needed to prove capacity.” Padama, supra note 21, at 186 
(emphasis added). This means that some of the “healthy sample” failed to meet the criteria for capacity. 
Due to the presumption of capacity, most people without disabilities would not ordinarily be evaluated; 
if people without any disability cannot meet the standard for capacity, what are the implications for how 
we currently approach decision-making rights and capacity? 
39. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text for discussion of the restriction of rights. 
40. R. Ryan Darby & Bradford C. Dickerson, Dementia, Decision Making, and Capacity, 25 
HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 270, 274 (2017). 
41. Wright, supra note 8, at 276 n.104. 
42. Id. (quoting Hugh Series, Best Interests Determination: A Medical Perspective, in THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA 91 (Charles Foster et al. eds., 2014)).  
43. Id. at 269 n.60. 
44. Id. at 269. 
45. Gavisk & Greene, supra note 18, at 340–41. 











professionals may then file reports that evaluate the individual’s “medical 
condition, cognitive and functional capacities, attempts to increase capacity, 
and level of supervision needed” as part of the guardianship process.46 Court 
personnel (e.g. a court investigator or guardian ad litem) may make a 
separate evaluation, and the individual as well as family members, friends, 
and other sources may provide input as appropriate.47 A probate judge 
makes the final determination of competency when deciding the 
guardianship petition.48 
For a judge to hold that an individual is incompetent usually “require[s] 
two findings: (1) the individual is at risk of harm because of an inability to 
provide for personal or financial needs; and (2) the individual lacks the 
cognitive ability to understand and appreciate decisions.”49 In determining 
incompetency, “the individual’s particular diagnosis or condition is not 
supposed to be determinative; what is supposed to matter is the functional 
ability to make decisions.”50 If a judge determines that an individual lacks 
the capacity to manage her own medical, financial, and daily affairs, the 
judge will find that person incompetent51—at which point the person loses 
the legal right to manage those affairs.52 Unlike in the medical context, 
where physicians evaluate capacity in relation to a specific activity, in the 
legal context, judges usually evaluate competence on an all-or-nothing basis 
and the threshold for incompetence is less clear.53 Most laws do not specify 
“the level or breadth of impairment or deficits necessary” for a finding of 
incompetence, so the court must act subjectively when deciding whether a 
 
46. Id. Unfortunately, such medical evidence is “often incomplete and inadequate.” Arias, supra 
note 2, at 147. “A study reviewing the clinical evaluations and determinations of incompetence for 
guardianship proceedings in three states reports that guardianship orders often lack adequate clinical 
basis.” Id. at 151.  
47. Gavisk & Greene, supra note 18, at 341. 
48. See id. 
49. Diller, supra note 8, at 500. 
50. Id. at 501. This approach is the result of reform efforts. “Reformers succeeded in changing 
the standard for determining whether to appoint a guardian from a diagnostic-based, medical declaration 
of incompetency to a functional assessment of the person’s ability to make decisions.” Id. at 505. “The 
movement to functional assessments of ‘capacity’ was significant in guardianship reform efforts in the 
1980s and 90s. This transition was a significant advance over earlier models in which ‘capacity’ was 
determined by status or medical diagnosis, or through an ‘outcomes’ approach.” Kristin Booth Glen, 
Introducing a “New” Human Right: Learning from Others, Bringing Legal Capacity Home, COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV., Spring 2018, at 1, 14 n.54. An outcomes approach bases the capacity determination 
on whether the individual’s decisions are considered to have good or bad consequences from the 
perspective of the evaluator. Id. at 35–36, n.164 (citing ANNA ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, RESTORING VOICE 
TO PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES: REALIZING THE RIGHT TO EQUAL RECOGNITION BEFORE 
THE LAW 84 (2017). 
51. Arias, supra note 2, at 147. 
52. Id. at 136. 
53. See id. at 150. Recent reforms have created the option of limited guardianships, which apply 
only to specific areas of decision-making. However, they are rarely used. See infra Part II.A for a 












person requires a guardian.54 Like capacity assessments, competency 
determinations face several criticisms, including overly broad 
determinations, vague standards, and inadequate supporting medical 
evidence.55 
II. SUBSTITUTED AND SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING  
If an individual lacks the capacity to make their own decisions, how will 
those decisions be made? Two possible answers are relevant to this Note.56 
First, another person could make those decisions on behalf of the individual 
who lacks capacity; second, someone could work with the person who lacks 
capacity to help them make their own decisions. The first choice is known 
as substituted decision-making and has strong legal precedent;57 the second 
is known as supported decision-making and, while it is often used 
informally, has only recently gained legal standing.58 
 
54. Arias, supra note 2, at 150. The American Bar Association and American Psychological 
Association attempted to provide some guidance through a handbook published in 2006. “The Handbook 
establishes a ‘six pillar’ analysis of capacity, including consideration of: (1) the individual’s medical 
status; (2) the individual’s cognitive function; (3) the individual’s everyday functioning; (4) the 
consistency of the individual’s choices with her values; (5) the potential risk of harm and the level of 
supervision needed; and (6) whether there are means to enhance capacity. . . . Without legislative 
adoption of this structure, judicial bodies are limited in their ability by current legislative language.” Id. 
(citing ABA COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N & NAT’L COLL. OF PROBATE 
JUDGES, JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY OF OLDER ADULTS IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS 
4–5 (2006), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/judges-diminished.pdf.). 
55. See id. at 147. 
56. A third alternative is the use of a written advanced directive or living will. These documents 
are prepared by an individual prior to the loss of decision-making capacity and may express preferences 
or decisions regarding a variety of matters, including healthcare. Professor Norman L. Cantor, for 
example, shared his own advance directive as an example of how to “hasten [one’s] post-competence 
demise” by rejecting “any and all life-sustaining means” after the loss of certain cognitive abilities. 
Norman L. Cantor, On Avoiding Deep Dementia, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2018, at 15, 16. 
Professor Rebecca Dresser criticized Cantor’s article and the use of advanced directives, opining that an 
individual’s expectations of life with a condition like dementia may not reflect the actual experience; 
she argues that advance decisions may not reflect contemporaneous best interests and preferences. 
Rebecca Dresser, Advance Directives and Discrimination Against People with Dementia, HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2018, at 26. 
57. For example, forty-one jurisdictions (when considering all fifty states and D.C.) have laws 
governing the “appointment of a default surrogate for medical decision making in the absence of an 
agent.” Erin S. DeMartino et al., Who Decides When a Patient Can’t? Statutes on Alternate Decision 
Makers, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1478, 1479 (2017). Substituted decision-making has been said to 
“dominate modern legal frameworks.” Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of 
Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 132 (2014). 
58. The first supported decision-making law passed in the United States in 2015; as of writing, 
only nine jurisdictions (including D.C.) have adopted such laws. See infra Part III. 











A. Substituted Decision-Making 
Substituted decision-making refers to systems in which someone is 
appointed to make a decision on another’s behalf based on the latter’s best 
interests.59 This Note will focus on guardianship, the system to which an 
estimated 1.5 million Americans are subject.60 A probate judge appoints a 
guardian upon finding that an individual “(1) meets the state’s standard for 
incompetence and (2) would benefit from a guardianship.”61 The legal62 and 
personal63 consequences of this decision are profound. Once the judge vests 
a surrogate (guardian) with the right to make decisions for the incapacitated 
person, the incapacitated person “ceases to be ‘a legal actor’ whose 
decisions receive legal recognition.”64 
A guardianship proceeding is, “by its nature, uncomfortable, 
embarrassing, and stigmatizing.”65 Guardianship has been called a “civil 
death,”66 and Congressman Claude Pepper claimed that “[t]he typical ward 
has fewer rights than the typical convicted felon.”67 This extreme loss of 
rights coupled with numerous and scandalous reports of abuse by 
guardians68 has led to strong critiques of and opposition to guardianship.69 
 
59. See Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 57, at 125. 
60. Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A 
Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (2013). The exact number is 
unknown due to insufficient recordkeeping. Id. 
61. Arias, supra note 2, at 147. 
62. Salzman, supra note 1, at 167 (“Guardianship laws potentially impact many decisions that 
define who we are as human beings: where and with whom we live; whether we can travel, marry, 
engage in certain social activities or interactions; whether we accept or reject medical treatment; and 
whether and how we manage our income and resources.”). 
63. Id. at 169, 170 (“As the individual is deprived of the right to make decisions, he or she 
experiences a loss of control and a feeling of helplessness that has critical implications for his or her 
psychological well-being.” Compounding this effect, “[t]he ‘disuse of decision-making powers’ may 
lead to further decline in the individual’s capabilities and sense of competence to act in the world, leading 
to further isolation and loss of abilities.”). 
64. Diller, supra note 8, at 501. 
65. Salzman, supra note 1, at 176. 
66. Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported Decision-
Making, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2012, at 8, 9 (quoting Robert D. Dinerstein, Guardianship and Its 
Alternatives, in ADULTS WITH DOWN SYNDROME 235, 236 (Siegfried M. Pueschel ed., 2006)). 
67. Diller, supra note 8, at 502 (quoting Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A 
National Disgrace: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong. 4 (1987) (statement of 
Rep. Claude Pepper, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Aging)). 
68. See, e.g., Who’s Guarding Against the Guardians?, WBUR (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.wbur 
.org/onpoint/2017/10/05/state-sanctioned-guardians [https://perma.cc/3EEB-JCHT]. The National 
Association to Stop Guardian Abuse also documents victims of abuse and seeks to empower and 
advocate for those who may be subject to guardianship. NAT’L ASS’N TO STOP GUARDIAN ABUSE, https:/ 
/www.stopguardianabuse.org [https://perma.cc/2TS2-N8F4]. 
69. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 66, at 9 (“Plenary guardianship falsely assumes that 













Guardianship has undergone a series of reforms in order to provide more 
dignity to the person subject to it and to reduce incidents of abuse.70 As one 
part of reform, policy makers created limited guardianship, “requiring 
courts to limit a guardian’s authority to only those realms of decision 
making with which the individual needs assistance,” as an alternative to the 
broad power granted under a plenary guardianship.71 The aim was to limit 
the guardian’s authority in direct relation to the individual’s specific 
deficits.72 However, people subject to a limited guardianship may still be 
treated as if they lack capacity in areas that are not covered by the order.73 
Perhaps even more troubling, judges rarely appoint limited guardians;74 
plenary guardians may be appointed “with only minimal investigation” of 
the individual’s capacity and deficits.75 The system’s preoccupation with 
determining whether an individual is incompetent or competent also means 
that little consideration is given to whether other “options that fall 
somewhere between autonomous and substituted decision making” should 
be legally recognized.76 Finally, reforms have also failed to end abuse, as 
“[a] steady drumbeat of press reports from around the country has 
confirmed that these deficiencies persist.”77  
Regardless of whether reforms can ever prevent abuse or adequately 
limit the use of guardianships, some argue that guardianship should not be 
allowed under any circumstances. At an international level, the U.N. 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the Committee”) has 
interpreted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”) as forbidding “all forms of substitute decision-making.”78 The 
 
all areas of an individual’s life; and that, once found to exist the individual (especially one with an 
intellectual disability) will not regain capacity at some later time. It fails to recognize that people with 
disabilities, like people without disabilities, have areas of varying capacity, in different areas of their 
lives, and at different times.”). 
70. See Diller, supra note 8, at 504. 
71. Salzman, supra note 1, at 174. 
72. See Arias, supra note 2, at 156. 
73. Salzman, supra note 1, at 176. 
74. See, e.g., Pamela B. Teaster, Erica F. Wood, Susan A. Lawrence & Winsor C. Schmidt, 
Wards of the State: A National Study of Public Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 199, 219 (2007) 
(noting that a study of guardianship in ten states in 1994 found that judges limited the guardianship in 
only thirteen percent of the guardianship orders, while a national study in 2005 found that public 
guardianship programs limited guardianship in only zero to ten percent of cases); Diller, supra note 8, 
at 508 (“[A] recent study reviewed all guardianship filings in 2008 in certain Indiana courts and found 
that limited guardianships were granted in less than one percent of the cases.”). 
75. Wright, supra note 8, at 272. 
76. Salzman, supra note 1, at 242–43. 
77. Diller, supra note 8, at 510. 
78. Id. at 513. Article 12 requires that states “recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.” Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Optional Protocol art. 12, ¶ 2, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States has 
signed, though not ratified, the CRPD; state laws, which govern guardianship, are therefore not bound 
 











Committee recognizes “legal capacity” as a human right distinct from 
“mental capacity,” so an individual should not be stripped of decision-
making authority regardless of decision-making ability.79 Within U.S. law, 
Leslie Salzman argues that guardianship presumptively violates the 
integration mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act by 
isolating people with disabilities from their community.80 Both she81 and the 
Committee82 express support for supported decision-making as an 
alternative to guardianship. 
B. Supported Decision-Making 
Under a model of supported decision-making (“SDM”), “an individual 
with cognitive challenges is the ultimate decision-maker but is provided 
support from one or more persons who explain issues to the individual and, 
where necessary, interpret the individual’s words and behavior to determine 
his or her preferences.”83 Independent living advocates devised SDM as a 
means of enabling people with disabilities to make decisions even though, 
under traditional systems, they would be found to lack decision-making 
capacity.84 SDM can be viewed as a tool of accessibility: 
[J]ust as we recognize that the law—and common principles of 
human decency—generally require that we build a ramp so that an 
individual with a physical impairment can enter a building without 
being carried up the steps, we should also recognize a legal obligation 
to provide decision-making support to an individual with limitations 
in mental capabilities rather than assign a guardian to make decisions 
for that person.85 
While terminology varies, for purposes of this Note, a principal is an 
adult who receives decision-making assistance through an SDM agreement 
or arrangement, and a supporter is an adult who provides that assistance. 
Four factors commonly characterize SDM arrangements: 
 
by the Convention, though “the United States is bound not to defeat its object and purpose.” Diller, supra 
note 8, at 514–15. 
79. See Diller, supra note 8, at 512–15, for a discussion of the right of legal capacity and its 
application in Article 12 of the CRPD. The CRPD has not adequately addressed the practical 
consequences of this approach in extreme cases. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
80. Salzman, supra note 1, at 206–09.  
81. Id. at 231. 
82. See Diller, supra note 8, at 514. 
83. Kohn et al., supra note 60, at 1120. See Karrie A. Shogren et al., Supported Decision Making: 
A Synthesis of the Literature Across Intellectual Disability, Mental Health, and Aging, 52 EDUC. & 
TRAINING AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 144 (2017), for a review of the literature on factors 
that influence decision-making, support needs, and supports. 
84. Diller, supra note 8, at 511–12. 












1. The principal retains legal decision-making rights; 
2. The principal enters the SDM arrangement voluntarily and may 
terminate it at will; 
3. The principal must be an active participant in making decisions 
covered by the arrangement; and 
4. Decisions made by the principal with a supporter are legally 
binding.86 
The transition from substituted to supported decision-making has been 
described as a “[p]aradigm [s]hift.”87 SDM simultaneously centers the 
individual in their own decision-making, and recognizes that it is not 
necessarily inconsistent for that individual to rely on the support of others, 
“so long as it is at the individual’s choosing.”88 
As the above factors demonstrate, SDM is a process-focused, not 
outcome-focused, reform. This focus creates the risk of declaring the 
decision-making process to be a “success” even if the decisions reached by 
that process are harmful, whether objectively or from the principal’s 
perspective.89 There is an unavoidable tension in simultaneously wanting to 
ensure decisions are in the principal’s best interest and to protect the 
principal’s autonomy; “allowing or even encouraging a person with 
cognitive or intellectual disability to ‘learn from mistakes’ may undermine 
efforts to protect that person from harmful outcomes.”90 With “little 
empirical evidence directly evaluating supported decision-making,”91 it is 
difficult to know how its use affects the principal. There is also a risk of 
abuse or undue influence by the supporter, who may not be trained or 
monitored; even a well-meaning supporter may unintentionally influence 
the principal’s decisions through the manner in which the supporter presents 
or discusses decisions,92 and there is no reason to assume that supporters 
will be well-meaning.93 These concerns do not suggest, however, that SDM 
 
86. Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and Appropriate 
Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 306–07 (2011). 
87. Kohn et al., supra note 60, at 1120. 
88. Dinerstein, supra note 66, at 10. 
89. Kohn et al., supra note 60, at 1141. 
90. Id. at 1142. Kohn et al. also note, “there is a potentially unavoidable paradox in 
acknowledging that a person has diminished decision-making capacity but maintaining that he or she is 
nevertheless capable of meaningfully contributing to decision-making discussions and that the decisions 
that result from such discussions reflect his or her wishes. Similarly, how does one avoid a similar 
paradox in maintaining that a person can make that decision with assistance unless one is confident that 
person has a ‘consistent set of values’ to ground such a decision?” Id. at 1140 (quoting OFFICE OF THE 
PUB. ADVOCATE, SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING: BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION PAPER 23 (2009)). 
91. Id. at 1128. 
92. Id. at 1137. 
93. Abuse by court-appointed guardians is a well-known concern. See infra note 68 and 
accompanying text. Supporters are in a similar position and may likewise abuse their position. 











“lacks normative justification.”94 While guardianship is critiqued as a de 
facto infringement on an individual’s rights,95 supported decision-making 
upholds and enforces those rights. 
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
Texas became the first state to pass a supported decision-making statute 
in 2015;96 seven other states and D.C. have since followed,97 and several 
other states have expressed support for SDM in guardianship laws98 or court 
decisions.99 There is no model language for SDM statutes; comparing state 
SDM laws reveals differences that could have a significant impact on who 
has access to SDM agreements and how these agreements affect their legal 
rights. An analysis of SDM laws in other countries (written prior to the 
existence of any U.S. statutes) found that “many of the statutory schemes 
widely described as enabling supported decision-making have features that 
are inconsistent with how its promoters typically define supported decision-
making.”100 This section addresses how each U.S. statute has answered 
several key questions related to supported decision-making and to what 
degree the statutes align with or differ from the aims of advocates and legal 
theorists.  
 
94. Diller, supra note 8, at 529. 
95. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
96. Wright, supra note 8, at 286; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357 (West 2019) (effective 
September 1, 2015). 
97. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56 (2019) (effective December 26, 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 
9401A–9410A (2020) (effective September 15, 2016); D.C. CODE § 7-2133 (2020) (effective May 5, 
2018); IND. CODE § 29-3-14 (2020) (effective July 1, 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.010 (2019) 
(effective July 1, 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36 (2019) (effective August 1, 2019); 42 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 66.13 (2020) (effective July 8, 2019); WIS. STAT. § 52 (2020) (effective April 18, 2018). 
98. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-401 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075(13)(4) (West 
2019). In Tennessee, a bill was introduced to codify supported decision-making agreements, but was 
eventually amended to add the term “least restrictive alternatives” to the definitions section within the 
guardianship statute. The definition was given as “techniques and processes that preserve as many 
decision-making rights as practical under the particular circumstances for the person with a disability.” 
In Your State: Tennessee, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING, http://supporteddecisio 
nmaking.org/state-review/tennessee [https://perma.cc/MVC5-PJ8C] (last updated Feb 1, 2020). See also 
2018 Tenn. Pub. Acts 605 (“AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 34 [Guardianship], 
relative to supported decision-making agreements”). 
99. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853, 856 (Sur. Ct. 2012) 
(finding “that guardianship is no longer warranted because there is now a system of supported decision 
making in place that constitutes a less restrictive alternate to the Draconian loss of liberty entailed by a 
plenary 17-A guardianship”; “supported decision making must be explored and exhausted before 
guardianship can be imposed”).  












A. What is Required of the Principal to Enter a Supported Decision-
Making Agreement? 
Under contract law, an individual must have legal competence to enter 
into a valid contract.101 If supported decision-making agreements require the 
same legal competence as other contracts, however, the group of people 
who could benefit from them would be restricted to those who are already 
able to make legally binding decisions on their own. Such a restriction 
would undermine the purpose of adding SDM as a legally recognized option 
for individuals with disabilities to avoid guardianship. The first inquiry 
when examining state statutes must therefore be to identify what group of 
individuals are able to participate in SDM agreements. Seven of the nine 
existing statutes specify that the existence of an SDM agreement should not 
be interpreted as evidence that the principal lacks capacity.102 Even if the 
principal does not by default lack capacity, does one have to have capacity 
to participate in an SDM agreement? That is, what level of capacity is 
required of the principal? 
Four states—Alaska, Delaware, Indiana, and Nevada—require that the 
principal “understands the nature and effect of the agreement.”103 Kristin 
Booth Glen regarded it as “a real step backward” that the Delaware law not 
only includes this requirement, but “relies on a medical model in 
determining capacity.”104 This approach fails to recognize decision-making 
as a right.105 As noted in Part I.A, understanding is one of the factors 
assessed when evaluating capacity in a medical context. However, the 
 
101. U.C.C. § 3-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The term “competence” has been used in the text for 
consistency within this Note; however, the sources actually refer to “capacity.” As noted in Part II, the 
terms are often used interchangeably. 
102. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(c) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9404A(c) (2020); IND. 
CODE § 29-3-14-4(c) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.300 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-04(6) 
(2019); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-4(c) (2020); WIS. STAT. § 52.03 (2020). 
103.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.010(b)(2) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(a)(2) (2020); 
IND. CODE § 29-3-14-4(a)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.200(1)(b) (2019). Those states also require that 
the principal “enter[] into the agreement voluntarily and without coercion or undue influence.” ALASKA 
STAT. § 13.56.010(b)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(a)(1); IND. CODE § 29-3-14-4(a)(1); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 162C.200(1)(a). The Wisconsin and D.C. statutes do not use this language, but do specify 
that the agreement must be voluntary. D.C. CODE § 7-2133(a) (2020); WIS. STAT. § 52.10(1) (2020). 
The voluntary nature of these agreements is discussed in more detail in Part II.D. Voluntariness is not 
relevant to the principal’s capacity, but rather recognizes that it is meaningless to enforce an agreement 
meant to protect an individual’s autonomy if the very formation of that agreement violated the 
individual’s autonomy. 
104. Glen, supra note 50, at 29. When Glen wrote her article, only the Texas and Delaware statutes 
existed; it is unclear if she would characterize the Alaska, Indiana, and Nevada laws as relying on a 
medical model. 
105. Glen critiques the practice of SDM in the United States for failing to focus on “the human 
right of legal capacity” and instead permitting the denial of that right based on the absence of “mental 
capacity, however defined.” Id. at 26–27. 











omission of any other factors suggests that a person may be eligible to 
participate in an SDM agreement even if they are unable to demonstrate 
capacity to make decisions on their own. It is also noteworthy that this 
clause only requires understanding “of the agreement” itself, as opposed to 
understanding of decisions that will be made under the agreement. There is 
no requirement that the principal must have the capacity to make decisions 
covered by the agreement without the help of a supporter. 
Alaska specifies that “a principal is considered to have capacity even if 
the capacity is achieved by the principal receiving decision-making 
assistance.”106 This is the only statute to directly affirm the capacity of the 
principal when relying on a supporter. Delaware similarly recognizes the 
validity of capacity achieved through use of a supporter; that statute allows 
“a judicial determination that the principal lacks the capacity to engage in 
the making of specific decisions covered by the agreement despite the 
assistance of a supporter”107 as grounds for limiting or abrogating the terms 
of the agreement. By implication, the principal may be found to have 
capacity to make these decisions with the “assistance of a supporter.” Both 
of these statutes acknowledge that an individual who cannot by themselves 
meet the requirements for capacity may be able to do so with a supporter. 
The supporter would therefore have to participate in the capacity 
assessment, which would require a significant change to how these 
assessments are typically conducted.108 
Rhode Island’s SDM statute operates from the principle that “[a]ll adults 
should be able to choose to live in the manner they wish and to accept or 
refuse support, assistance, or protection.”109 This statute does not indicate, 
however, if there are any limitations to the use of an SDM agreement based 
on the individual’s capacity. The expansive language (“[a]ll adults”) implies 
that there are no restrictions based on capacity—even an adult who has been 
deemed incapacitated would be able to “accept . . . support.” Compare this 
to language in the Nevada statute, which states as the first principle to be 
used in interpreting the statute: “An adult should be able to live in the 
manner in which he or she wishes and to accept or refuse support, assistance 
or protection as long as the adult does not harm others and is capable of 
making decisions about such matters.”110 Nevada thus included a capacity 
determination as a prerequisite to participation in an SDM agreement. The 
phrase “about such matters” may appear to limit the scope of capacity 
 
106. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(d). 
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(i) (emphasis added). 
108. See Arias, supra note 2, at 145–46, for a discussion of capacity assessment methods and 
instruments. 
109. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-2(b)(1) (2020). 












needed, but it depends how one understands “such matters”: Need the 
principal only have capacity to decide to accept or refuse support, or need 
they have capacity to decide the manner in which they wish to live? Given 
that the first clause—that “the adult does not harm others”—only seems 
relevant to decisions about how the person lives, it seems likely that the 
second clause is likewise focused on those life decisions. The scope of the 
required capacity is therefore hardly limited at all.111  
Two lines later, the Nevada statute includes as a third principle, “An 
adult should receive the most effective, yet least restrictive and intrusive, 
form of support, assistance or protection when the adult is unable to manage 
his or her affairs alone.”112 This principle guides the determination of 
appropriate support for anyone who lacks capacity “alone,” so it does not 
contemplate the effect of a supporter on the capacity determination. The 
principle calls for balancing effectiveness with restrictiveness; if SDM is 
effective, it is preferable to guardianship because it is also less restrictive. 
If SDM is ineffective, then guardianship may be preferable. Notably, 
however, the statute does not define “effective” in this context.113 
Texas, on the other hand, states that the SDM statute is intended to 
benefit “adults with disabilities who need assistance with decisions 
regarding daily living but who are not considered incapacitated persons for 
purposes of establishing a guardianship.”114 It has been noted that the Texas 
statute does not directly state a capacity requirement for participation in an 
SDM agreement, but that “the advocates responsible for its passage appear 
to believe that the traditional test of ‘understand and appreciate’ applies.”115  
As shown, existing statutes are inconsistent in what they require of the 
principal to a supported decision-making agreement. The majority view is 
that the principal must have, at a minimum, the limited capability of 
understanding the agreement.116 Some statutes do not specify that any level 
 
111. What kind of decisions fall outside the ambit of the manner in which a person wishes to live? 
While it would be possible to imagine minor decisions (e.g. whether to turn left or turn right while out 
for an evening stroll) that do not affect the manner in which one lives, it becomes more difficult to 
exclude decisions as they grow in importance (e.g. whether to exercise regularly or whether to live in an 
area with sidewalks and parks for taking walks).  
112. § 162C.100(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
113. This is similar to the risk a patient faces of a doctor questioning their decision-making 
capacity because the patient disagrees with the doctor’s recommendations. See supra note 21. The lack 
of a definition of “effective” will allow judges to make normative judgments about an individual’s 
decisions in managing their affairs. A judge may determine that support is only “effective” if it results 
in decisions that the judge feels are in the individual’s best interests. The idiosyncratic principal whose 
decisions the judge considers harmful or suboptimal is at greater risk of being subjected to guardianship 
because the judge finds SDM ineffective. See supra note 89–90 and accompanying text for additional 
discussion of the tension between protecting best interests and protecting the right to self-determination.  
114. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.003 (West 2019) (emphasis added). 
115. Glen, supra note 50, at 29. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text for discussion of 
the “understand” and “appreciate” factors in capacity evaluations. 
116. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 











of capacity is required of the principal,117 while one statute requires that the 
principal have capacity with regard to all decisions covered by the 
agreement.118 These capacity requirements determine what population of 
individuals have access to supported decision-making. Capacity 
requirements also provide insight into whether SDM can fulfill the ambition 
of reformers to eliminate guardianships.119 The following section addresses 
this question. 
B. How Does Supported Decision-Making Relate to Guardianship? 
At first blush, SDM agreements and guardianship both seem to exist as 
solutions to the same problem: how to decide the affairs of someone whose 
ability to do so personally is compromised. Are these solutions 
complementary or contradictory? The CRPD, as interpreted by the 
Committee, aims to eliminate guardianships entirely and replace them with 
mechanisms that provide support to people with disabilities.120 Advocates 
of this outcome may find the two approaches to be contradictory in their 
underlying principles, with SDM prioritizing individual autonomy and 
guardianship providing paternalistic protection. However, the replacement 
of guardianships is not a necessary or inevitable goal of SDM statutes. No 
U.S. jurisdiction has taken the step of dismantling its guardianship system, 
so where SDM statutes exist, they exist side-by-side with guardianship 
statutes.  
The following diagrams illustrate the possible meanings of “side-by-
side.” The lines represent the capacity spectrum, and the circles indicate the 
group eligible to be served by either SDM agreements (SDM) or 
guardianships (G). All adults are assumed to be onthe left, with full 
capacity.121 However, an assessment may indicate that an individual lacks 
certain abilities, pushing that individual further to the right.122 Eventually, 
on the far right, are people with no capacity for decision-making at all, such 
as those who are in comas. A plenary guardianship assumes that an 
individual is at the far right of the spectrum and unable to care for 
themselves or manage their own affairs in any part of their lives.123 The 
 
117. See supra notes 107 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
120. Diller, supra note 8, at 513–14. 
121. See, e.g., Arias, supra note 2, at 139 (“Clinicians and professionals operate from a 
presumption of capacity.”); Gavisk & Greene, supra note 18, at 340 (“All adults are presumed to possess 
capacity unless adjudicated as incapacitated in guardianship or conservatorship proceedings”). 
122. See discussion infra Part I.A. 












question that must be addressed by SDM statutes124 is whether and how 
much of the population currently served by guardianship laws will have the 
option of using an SDM agreement. There are four possibilities:  
1. Separate Populations: This scenario would occur if the SDM and 
guardianship statutes defined mutually exclusive requirements for the 
populations that they serve. For example, Texas’s SDM statute states that it 
is meant to “recognize a less restrictive substitute for guardianship for adults 
with disabilities . . . who are not considered incapacitated persons for 
purposes of establishing a guardianship.”125 This statute envisions SDM 
agreements serving a completely separate population from the guardianship 
law, because people who are incapacitated and may be placed under 
guardianship cannot participate in SDM. Similarly, the Delaware statute 
states that its purpose is to “[p]rovide assistance . . . to adults who do not 
 
124. While this analysis focuses on statutes pertaining to supported decision-making agreements, 
some jurisdictions reference SDM within their guardianship law, though they lack a specific SDM 
statute. For a discussion on the existence of supported decision-making language within guardianship 
statutes and cases, see Wright, supra note 8, at 294–95. Wright argues that “principles of supported 
decisionmaking should be built into [guardianship] laws. That is, where possible, surrogates and 
guardians should support persons with disabilities in making their own decisions rather than taking over 
the decision-making process.” Id. at 301. However, guardianship laws limit the rights of the individual 
subject to them and confer authority on the guardian. See supra Part II.A. While SDM could be 
encouraged in this context, it is not clear if or how it could be enforced. In addition, appointing a guardian 
over an individual who is still capable of making their own decisions with support would be an 
unnecessary intrusion on that individual’s rights. The Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship, and 
Other Protective Arrangements Act (“the Act”) takes the position that guardianship is not appropriate 
and should not be imposed if supported decision-making (or another alternative that “remove[s] fewer 
rights than guardianship”) is available and sufficient to meet the individual’s needs. UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 301 cmt. (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2017). Even if the individual petitions the court to appoint a guardian for themselves, the 
drafters of the Act note that it would be preferable for the individual to use a power of attorney or SDM. 
§ 302 cmt. The Act requires that the court make a finding that SDM (and other alternatives) cannot meet 
the individual’s needs before appointing a guardian. § 310(a)(1). 
125. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.003 (West 2019). The “substitute” language is, perhaps, telling. 
The original language in the Senate Bill was “alternative,” but this was replaced by the House Bill with 
“substitute.” See S. 1881, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.R. 39, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “alternative” means “offering or expressing a choice,” 
Alternative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alternative [https://per 
ma.cc/B2HN-GKU2]; “substitute,” on the other hand, means a “thing that takes the place or function of 
another.” Substitute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substitute [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2HML-SY69]. The significance of this word choice hints at the policy choice of whether 
SDM was intended to be an option available for individuals to choose, or a replacement for guardianship 
in circumstances where it was not needed. 
SDM G 











need a guardian.”126 This type of SDM statute is the most limiting in terms 
of who may participate. 
2. Intersecting Populations: This scenario would occur when there is some 
overlap between the requirements for participation in SDM agreements and 
guardianship; while some individuals may only participate in one or the 
other, some could participate in either—or even both. For example, both the 
Alaska and Indiana SDM statutes allow an individual subject to 
guardianship to enter an SDM agreement; written consent of the guardian is 
required if the SDM agreement interferes with the guardian’s authority.127 
As noted earlier, the Alaska statute also recognizes an individual’s capacity 
when that capacity is achieved with support.128 In that case, if a supporter is 
available, the individual may be found to have capacity and thus not be 
subject to a guardianship; if no supporter is present, the individual may be 
found to lack capacity and thus be subject to a guardianship. The statutes do 
not limit SDM to those who lack capacity on their own, however, so some 
individuals may enter an SDM agreement even though they would not have 
been subject to guardianship without it. Because Alaska and Indiana also 
require that principals to SDM agreements understand the agreement,129 
some individuals may not qualify and are subject to guardianship only. 
3. Subset Population: Similar to intersecting populations, this scenario 
would occur if the overlap in requirements for the principal in an SDM 
agreement and a person subject to guardianship make one population a 
subset of the other. In this scenario, all people who are subjected to 
guardianships qualify as principals to SDM agreements, but some people 
who participate in SDM are not subject to guardianship (or vice versa). 
 
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9402A(a)(1) (2020). 
127. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.010(c) (2019); IND. CODE § 29-3-14-4(d) (2020).  
128. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(d) (2019); see supra text accompanying note 104. 


















Rhode Island’s SDM statute may provide an example. One of the purposes 
of the Rhode Island law is to “[e]stablish the use of supported decision-
making as an alternative to guardianship.”130 As noted previously, this law 
is also to be interpreted by the principle that “[a]ll adults should be able to 
choose to live in the manner they wish and to accept or refuse support, 
assistance, or protection.”131 This language suggests that Rhode Island 
makes SDM agreements available to everyone, while stopping short of 
eliminating guardianship. In other words, all individuals who need 
assistance have access to SDM, and a subset of that population may still be 
subject to guardianship due to personal choice, lack of an appropriate 
supporter, or for other reasons. This statute is the most expansive and 
inclusive with regards to SDM. 
4. Same Populations: This scenario would occur if the requirements to 
participate in an SDM agreement were identical to the requirements to be 
subject to guardianship. In this case, an individual could presumably choose 
which system they preferred, or other factors may weigh into the decision, 
such as the availability of a supporter. No statutes currently follow this 
model. 
As this analysis shows, there is little agreement regarding the 
relationship between supported decision-making and guardianships; several 
jurisdictions do not even clearly address the issue.132 Perhaps the only point 
of agreement is that supported decision-making cannot fully replace 
guardianships. 
C. What is Required of the Supporter? 
There is likely an underlying assumption that a principal would not select 
or retain a supporter who did not have the capacity to offer support.133 North 
 
130. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-2(a)(4) (2020). 
131. § 66.13-2(b)(1); see supra text accompanying note 107. 
132. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2133 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.100 (2019); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 30.1-36 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 52 (2020). 
133. Not all jurisdictions entrust the principal to choose whomever they wish. Several statutes 
prohibit certain categories of people from serving as supporters, such as people who may have a conflict 
of interest (e.g. the principal’s employer or employee) and people who may be a threat to the principal 















Dakota has the only statute that references supporter capacity.134 There, an 
SDM agreement is terminated if a “court has determined the supporter lacks 
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning 
residential or educational matters, medical treatment, legal affairs, or 
vocational, financial, or other matters affecting the health or safety of the 
named individual.”135 Four other states require that the supporter “act with 
the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily exercised by individuals in 
similar circumstances, with due regard either to the possession of, or lack 
of, special skills or expertise.”136 
The Texas statute articulates the most basic formulation of the 
supporter’s role, stating, “A supporter may exercise the authority granted to 
the supporter in the supported decision-making agreement.”137 North 
Dakota and Wisconsin explicitly state that the supporter may not act as a 
“surrogate decisionmaker” or sign legally binding documents on the 
principal’s behalf.138 Delaware and Indiana list several prohibited 
activities,139 and Indiana also states the affirmative responsibilities of the 
 
offenses). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.020 (2019) (“A supporter must be an adult, but may not be 
(1) an employer or employee of the principal, unless the employer or employee is an immediate family 
member of the principal; (2) a person who provides paid support services, except decision-making 
assistance, directly to the principal, unless the person is an immediate family member of the principal; 
or (3) a person against whom a protective order or restraining order has been entered by a court on 
request of or on behalf of the principal.”); D.C. CODE § 7-2132 (2020) (“(a) The following individuals, 
except if the individual is the supported person’s relative, may not be a supporter: (1) An individual who 
provides physical, mental, or behavioral healthcare services or disability services to the supported 
person, or the owner or operator of the entity providing the healthcare services or disability services to 
the supported person; or (2) An individual who works for a government agency that is financially 
responsible for the supported person’s care. (b)(1) An individual shall not be a supporter if: (A) There 
is or has been a finding by a government agency that the individual: (i) Abused, neglected, or exploited 
the supported person; or (ii) Inflicted harm upon a child, elderly individual, or person with a disability; 
or (B) The individual is or has been convicted of any of the following criminal offenses, or their 
equivalent in any other state or territory, within 7 years before entering the supported decision-making 
agreement: (i) Any sexual offense . . . where the victim was a child, elderly individual, or person with a 
disability; (ii) Aggravated assault, . . . where the victim was a child, elderly individual, or person with a 
disability; (iii) Fraud . . . ; (iv) Theft in the first degree . . . ; (v) Forgery . . . ; or (vi) Extortion . . . .”). 
134. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-05(3)(c) (2019). 
135. Id. 
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(d) (2020); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-6(c) (2020); see also 
ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.090 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.210(3) (2019). 
137. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.052(a) (West 2019). 
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-04(7) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 52.10(2) (2020). 
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(c); IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(c) (2020) (“A supporter is 
prohibited from: (1) exerting undue influence upon the adult; (2) receiving a fee for service related solely 
to services performed in the role of supporter; (3) obtaining, without the consent of the adult, information 
acquired for a purpose other than assisting the adult in making a specific decision authorized by the 
supported decision making agreement; (4) acting outside the scope of authority provided in the supported 
decision making agreement; or (5) obtaining, without the consent of the adult, nonpublic personal 












supporter.140 Four states require that the supporter sign a “declaration” 
indicating their relationship to the principal, their willingness to act as a 
supporter, and their acknowledgment of their duties as a supporter.141 This 
survey should make clear that there are significant disparities in the detail 
provided regarding the duties and permitted authority of the supporter; 
however, with no clear mechanism for training or monitoring supporters,142 
this statutory language may be all that supporters have in trying to 
understand their role. 
D. What is the Role of the State? 
In all nine jurisdictions, all that is required to enter an SDM agreement 
is the signature of a notary or two witnesses;143 unlike guardianship, the 
State need not make any determination about the principal’s capacity or be 
involved in any way.144 This is in keeping with the general presumption that 
all adults are competent and can therefore enter into binding agreements.145 
Requiring court oversight is also unnecessary because, unlike when a 
guardian is assigned, the principal is not giving up any rights under an SDM 
agreement.146 Involving the court would likely only make the process more 
expensive while burdening the court system. 
In addition, none of the statutes include any provision for the state to 
monitor the supporter or the agreement. This is striking given that SDM 
agreements are intended to serve similar populations to those served by 
guardianships, and abuses by guardians are well documented; indeed, it is 
in part in response to those abuses that SDM and other alternatives have 
gained attention.147 Presumably, the expectation in most jurisdictions is that 
individuals who are participating in SDM agreements, because they have 
not lost their rights to act independently, have greater opportunity to protect 
themselves; they can, for example, terminate the agreement at any time.148 
The SDM statutes also often provide means for reporting suspected abuse. 
For example, the SDM agreement, which is intended to be shown to third 
 
140. IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(a) (“A supporter must: (1) support the will and preference of the 
adult, and not the supporter's opinion of the adult's best interests; (2) act honestly, diligently, and in good 
faith; (3) act within the scope set forth in the adult's supported decision making agreement; (4) avoid 
conflicts of interest; and (5) notify the adult in writing of the supporter's intent to resign as a supporter.”). 
141. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.050 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(f) (2020); IND. CODE 
§ 29-3-14-7(d) (2020); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-5(e) (2020). 
142. See supra note 92 and accompanying text regarding the need to monitor supporters. 
143. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.040(3) (2019); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.055(a) (West 
2019). 
144. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra note 119. 
146. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-5(g) (2020). 











parties, in many cases includes language instructing the third party on how 
to report suspected abuse.149 Several states provide for the automatic 
termination of the agreement if the supporter has committed certain acts, 
such as fraud,150 and/or prohibit individuals from serving as supporters if 
they have previously committed certain acts, such as elder abuse.151 Overall, 
however, it is left to individuals—the principal, supporter, or third parties—
to identify possible abuses or violations and report them, with no 
consequences outlined in the SDM statutes themselves. With no real 
safeguards in place, SDM may put the principal at significant risk. 
IV. MODEL STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
If current attitudes152 continue and more states consider the adoption of 
supported decision-making statutes, it becomes prudent to develop model 
language. Consistency across jurisdictions may ensure that agreements are 
recognized and followed all over the country, providing the principal with 
greater mobility. The development of model language also provides the 
opportunity to lay bare the assumptions and trade-offs behind statutory 
schemes so that legislators can more fully consider the implications of the 
legislation. This Note will not endeavor to address the full scope of a 
supported decision-making statute, but will only consider the topics 
analyzed above: competency requirements for principals, how SDM relates 
to guardianship, requirements of supporters, and the role of the State. 
A. Competency Requirements for Principals 
As noted in Part III.A, existing statutes have articulated different 
competency requirements for the principal entering into a supported 
 
149. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2132(d) (“WARNING: PROTECTION FOR PERSON 
SUPPORTED [:] IF A PERSON WHO RECIVES [RECEIVES] A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR 
IS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT HAS CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE 
ADULT NAMED AS A SUPPORTED PERSON IS BEING ABUSED, NEGLECTED, OR 
EXPLOITED BY THE SUPPORTER, THE PERSON MAY REPORT THE ALLEGED ABUSE, 
NEGLECT, OR EXPLOITATION TO THE CITYWIDE CALL CENTER AT 311, METROPOLITAN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT AT 911, ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES AT (202) 541-3950.”) (second 
alteration in original). 
150. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-3-14-9(a) (2020) (“Except as provided in the supported decision 
making agreement, a supported decision making agreement terminates in the following situations: . . . 
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction determines that a supporter has used the supported decision making 
agreement to commit: (A) financial exploitation; (B) abuse; or (C) neglect; of the adult.”). 
151. See supra note 131. 
152. The adoption of supported decision-making is due not only to the recognition of decision-
making as a right, but also to financial considerations. In Texas, SDM was presented by Chief Justice 
Nathan Hecht and others as a cost-saving measure that could help the court weather the “silver tsunami.” 













decision-making agreement. Those requirements in large part determine 
what population of people may participate in the agreements. To be 
consistent with the goal of SDM as a tool for providing access, SDM statutes 
should not require that the principal have full capacity. To have capacity (or 
“not be incapacitated”) is to already have the legal ability to make decisions 
about one’s life; an SDM agreement provides minimal benefit in this 
context. People who cannot meet the standards for capacity, however, can 
gain tremendous independence through the use of SDM as a decision-
making tool. 
At the same time, it would be disingenuous to claim that everyone, 
regardless of condition, can participate meaningfully in SDM.153 Rebekah 
Diller, referring to the CRPD’s approach, found that it “seems to rely on a 
legal fiction that persons will remain the legal actors making their own 
decisions under circumstances where it may not be possible to discern their 
will and preferences. . . . [T]he pragmatic problems are so substantial that 
they risk undermining the rest of the project.”154 To avoid that risk, statutes 
must be explicit in defining the minimum competency to be required of the 
principal. Most importantly, the principal must be able to understand the 
agreement itself—as required by the majority of existing statutes.155 
Understanding SDM and the role of the supporter allows the principal to 
utilize the arrangement under their own initiative; if the principal does not 
know what a supporter is there to do, the principal will not seek out their 
support when faced with decisions. 
In addition, the statute should make it clear that any decision made or 
action taken by the principal with the aid of a supporter is legally valid and 
binding (absent the sort of extenuating circumstances that could void any 
decision). To this end, the statute should acknowledge that an individual 
using a supporter is considered to be competent to the same degree as if they 
had the same capability acting alone. An individual who is able to 
communicate a decision through a supporter, or who develops their 
understanding of a situation through a supporter, is just as competent as an 
individual who does these things without a supporter. This affirmation of 
the principal’s competency supports the purpose of the statute and may 
resolve challenges to decisions made by the principal. 
Finally, it has been noted that individuals subject to a limited 
guardianship are sometimes treated as though they lack capacity in other 
 
153. This does not mean that guardianships cannot be replaced via other means. Advocates for the 
elimination of guardianships, including supporters of the CRPD, may propose alternative systems that 
fill the gap left by SDM agreements. This paper is confined to SDM, however, and finds that it would 
not be appropriate to use SDM, as currently understood in the United States, in every case in which an 
individual lacks capacity. 
154. Diller, supra note 8, at 534. 
155. See supra Part III.A. 











areas as well.156 The same problem may happen to principals in an SDM 
agreement. To minimize this issue, the statute should re-affirm the principle 
that all adults are considered competent until otherwise shown, and should 
establish as guidance to courts that the existence of an SDM agreement may 
not be interpreted as evidence of an individual’s incompetence or 
incapacity. 
The following language, adapted from existing statutes,157 may be used 
as a model: 
1. An adult may enter into a supported decision-making agreement if all 
of the following apply: 
a. The adult enters into the agreement voluntarily and without 
coercion or undue influence.158 
b. The adult understands the nature and effect of the agreement.159 
2. All adults are presumed to be capable of managing their affairs and to 
have capacity unless otherwise determined by the [relevant court].160 
a. A principal is considered to have capacity even if the capacity is 
achieved by the principal receiving decision-making assistance.161 
b. Execution of a supported decision-making agreement may not be 
used as evidence of incapacity and does not preclude the ability of 
the adult who has entered into such an agreement to act 
independently of the agreement.162 
B. Relationship to Guardianship 
Under the above capacity requirement, the population served by SDM 
agreements and guardianships will be overlapping. Guardianship would still 
be available for those who do not meet the “understanding” threshold to 
participate in SDM agreements. Individuals who do meet the 
“understanding” threshold may enter an SDM agreement or may be 
appointed a guardian if, without support, they lack capacity to make 
independent decisions; this is the overlapping population. Some individuals, 
however, may choose to enter an agreement even though they would not be 
subject to a guardianship otherwise.163 
 
156. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 95–96 for all statutes considered in the drafting of these model provisions. 
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(a)(1) (2020). 
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(a)(2). 
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9404A(a) (2020). 
161. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(d) (2019). 
162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9404A(c). 
163. For example, people whose conditions will decline over time, such as individuals with 
dementia, may benefit from building a relationship with a supporter while they still retain decision-













If the would-be principal already has an appointed guardian, some 
statutes require that the guardian approve the SDM agreement if it would 
cover the same areas as the guardianship.164 This requirement puts the 
principal’s ability to enter an SDM agreement and execute their decision-
making rights at the discretion of the guardian, with no recourse for the 
individual. The statute could remove any barrier to people subject to 
guardianship entering SDM agreements, but this could result in significant 
confusion, for example if the guardian is unaware of the SDM agreement 
and continues acting on the principal’s behalf. The principal, as someone 
who has already been found incompetent, may also be particularly 
vulnerable to abuse; in the balance of best interests and individual rights, 
the guardian should be able to intervene to protect the person subject to the 
guardianship. The statute can protect the individual’s rights by creating a 
mechanism for the individual to enter an SDM agreement despite the 
guardian’s protest if the principal is able to achieve capacity with the 
supporter, thus vacating (or limiting) the need for the guardian. 
The following language may be used as a model: 
1. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the use of supported 
decision-making as an alternative to guardianship165 for adults who 
meet the requirements of this chapter. 
2. An adult may not enter into a supported decision-making agreement 
under this section if the agreement supplants the authority of a 
guardian of the adult, unless 
a. The guardian consents in writing to the adult entering into the 
supported decision-making agreement;166 or 
b. The adult appeals to the court that appointed the guardian and 
demonstrates that the adult is able to act with capacity with the aid 
of the supporter named in the supported decision-making 
agreement. 
C. Requirements for Supporter 
North Dakota requires supporters to have the “capacity to make . . . 
responsible decisions.”167 Under SDM, however, it is not the supporter who 
 
so that, when the principal’s condition deteriorates, the supporter is in a position to take on additional 
decision-making responsibility (up to and including becoming a guardian). Arias, supra note 2, at 157. 
164. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. This would come into play, for example, if the 
guardian has authority to make financial decisions and the principal wishes to enter an agreement that 
would provide support for the principal to manage their own finances. 
165. See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 66.13-2(a)(4) (2020). 
166. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-4(d) (2020). 
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-05(3)(c) (2019). 











is making the decision, but the principal;168 the statute’s language is 
therefore misleading. Any capacity restrictions should be applied only to 
the principal, including the principal’s capacity when acting with support. 
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a principal selects a 
supporter who has or develops mental impairments; for example, an older 
person in the early stages of dementia may view their spouse as a natural 
choice for their supporter, but the spouse, too, may develop mild cognitive 
impairments as they age. Whether the supporter is able to provide adequate 
support is determined not by their own capacity, but by the principal’s 
capacity when acting with support. The supporter need only have sufficient 
capacity to enable the principal to meet the requirements specified in Part 
IV.A. The legislature should therefore leave it to the principal to determine 
who they wish to rely on for support.169  
Supporters must also demonstrate an awareness of their duties and a 
willingness to fulfill their responsibilities with due care. Requiring 
supporters to sign a declaration at the inception of the agreement is one 
means of accomplishing this goal, though it provides little assurance of the 
supporter’s understanding of the agreement. Many advocates suggest 
mandating training for supporters as a more proactive measure, though 
additional research is needed regarding supporters’ performance to 
determine what training would be most effective.170 The statute should at a 
minimum specify the supporters’ responsibilities and duty of care. The 
following serves as model language, derived from existing statutes: 
1. A supporter must: 
a. Support the will and preference of the principal, and not the 
supporter’s opinion of the principal’s best interests;171 
b. Act within the scope set forth in the principal’s supported decision-
making agreement;172 
c. Act with the care and diligence ordinarily exercised by individuals 
in similar circumstances, with due regard to the supporter’s 
possession of, or lack of, special skills or expertise;173 
d. Avoid conflicts of interest,174 and make any such conflicts known 
to the principal;  
 
168. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
169. See Arias, supra note 2, at 157–58 for a comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of the 
principal selecting family or friends as supporters compared to the court appointing a supporter, as 
occurs in jurisdictions outside the U.S. 
170. See Kohn et al., supra note 60, at 1144. 
171. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(a)(1) (2020). 
172. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(a)(3). 
173. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.210(3) (2019). 












e. Complete court-approved training on the duties and obligations of 
the supporter;  
f. Sign a declaration indicating 
i. The supporter’s relationship to the principal;175 
ii. The supporter’s willingness to act as a supporter;176 and 
iii. The supporter’s acknowledgement of the duties and 
obligations of a supporter;177 and 
g. Notify the principal in writing of the supporter’s intent to resign as 
a supporter.178 
2. A supporter is prohibited from: 
a. Acting as a surrogate decision-maker for the principal or signing 
legal documents on behalf of the principal;179 
b. Exerting undue influence upon the principal;180 
c. Receiving a fee for service related solely to services performed in 
the role of supporter;181 
d. Obtaining, without the consent of the principal, information 
acquired for a purpose other than assisting the principal in making 
a specific decision authorized by the supported decision-making 
agreement;182 or 
e. Acting outside the scope of authority provided in the supported 
decision-making agreement.183 
The statute should also specify the consequences of a failure to fulfill 
statutory obligations or the commission of a prohibited act. Appropriate 
consequences could vary from voiding the agreement to criminal sanctions 
for abuse or fraud. 
D. Role of the State 
Because adults are presumed to have capacity,184 there is no need for the 
State to verify that an individual meets the requirements of entering an SDM 
agreement prior to the creation of that agreement.185 The primary role of the 
State is therefore to establish SDM agreements as a legal option and then to 
 
175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(f)(1) (2020). 
176. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(f)(2). 
177. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9405A(f)(3). 
178. IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(a)(5). 
179. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-04(7) (2019). 
180. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(c)(1). 
181. IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(c)(2). 
182. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(c)(3). 
183. See IND. CODE § 29-3-14-5(c)(4). 
184. See supra note 119. 
185. The State may, of course, verify the principal’s understanding if the agreement is challenged 
on this basis. 











monitor these agreements. As noted in Part II.A, a common critique of 
guardianship is that insufficient monitoring has allowed frequent and 
significant abuses of the system. Similar risks may arise under SDM 
agreements—in fact, ensuring that these agreements do not make 
individuals “more vulnerable to abuse” has been described as the “most 
significant challenge to supported decision-making.”186 Unfortunately, the 
ability of the principal to terminate the agreement may not be sufficient to 
protect against such abuses; if the principal faces limitations in overseeing 
the supporter’s actions or communicating concerns to third parties, the 
supporter may be able to hide any misconduct. Monitoring is thus necessary 
“to avoid trading an underfunded guardianship system for underfunded 
supported decision-making services that are unable to meet the goal of 
maximizing the integration of individuals with limitations in decision-
making abilities.”187 
A monitoring system would have three mandates tied to the three parties. 
First, monitoring should ensure that principals continue to meet the 
requirements to maintain the agreement; if a principal loses the ability to 
understand the agreement, then the court may void the agreement and 
determine if other arrangements are needed. Second, monitoring should 
oversee the actions taken by the supporter. If the supporter is not fulfilling 
their legal duties, then the monitor could take action, including taking the 
supporter to court.188 Among the duties to be considered is whether the 
supporter is exceeding the authority granted them by the principal. Finally, 
monitoring may consider whether any third parties have failed to honor the 
agreement. Third party breaches are likely to be identified only when they 
are reported to the monitoring body, so the SDM agreement should clearly 
indicate how any party can report suspected violations. Because SDM 
agreements can only be effective in realizing the principal’s decision-
making right if they are observed by third parties, this should be a 
requirement.189 
Monitoring systems under supported decision-making statutes will likely 
reflect the monitoring system in a state’s guardianship statute.190 No model 
 
186. Diller, supra note 8, at 535. 
187. Salzman, supra note 1, at 230. 
188. See Wright, supra note 8, at 310 (citing MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, LAW COMM’N 
OF ONT., A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 118 
(2010)). 
189. See Glen, supra note 50, at 21. 
190. For discussion of strategies used and recommended for monitoring guardianships, see Naomi 
Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of Court Practices, 37 STETSON 
L. REV. 143 (2007) (discussing findings from a 2005 AARP national survey of monitoring practices); 
and NAOMI KARP & ERICA WOOD, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: PROMISING 













language is provided here to account for inevitable variations in state 
resources and reporting structures; however, by applying the above 
principles to existing structures, the legislature may develop its own 
monitoring framework. 
CONCLUSION 
With millions of Americans living with disabilities that may affect their 
decision-making capacity,191 it is critical that the legal system consider how 
it protects their rights and interests. Although the number of individuals 
subject to guardianship is unknown, the current challenges to guardianship 
implementation and accountability call into question whether this system is 
capable of fulfilling its purpose to protect vulnerable adults.192 Normative 
challenges call into question whether any level of reforms would be 
sufficient to redeem a model based on the denial of rights. 
Supported decision-making agreements offer an alternative to 
guardianship that may prevent abuse and protect the rights of people with 
disabilities.193 Although more research is needed on how these agreements 
are used, the recent passage of legislation in nine jurisdictions sanctioning 
SDM agreements as a legal tool indicates that this model is gaining traction 
in American jurisprudence.194 However, variations in the way these bills are 
drafted may lead to outcomes that fall short of advocates’ goals. Statutes 
vary in who may participate in and benefit from SDM. In some cases, SDM 
is unavailable to individuals who can be made subject to guardianship, so it 
does nothing to address the problems in the guardianship model.195 In other 
jurisdictions, individuals who could benefit from SDM may have the 
opportunity to choose this model either to avoid guardianship or to reclaim 
decision-making power even when subject to guardianship.196 
Unfortunately, no jurisdiction offers training or other assistance to 
supporters or creates a mechanism for monitoring SDM agreements, 
creating the risk of misuse and abuse.197 
The model statutory language proposed by this Note is intended to 
maximize the benefits of SDM agreements. Statutes should be written such 
that all adults who are capable of understanding and freely entering the 
agreement have the opportunity to take advantage of SDM, particularly 
when doing so may allow them to avoid the loss of rights that would occur 
 
191. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra Part II.A. 
193. See supra Part II.B. 
194. See supra Part III. 
195. See supra Part III.B. 
196. See supra Part III.B. 
197. See supra Part III.D. 











if they were subjected to guardianship. While this will not eliminate 
guardianships in the cases of individuals who have no ability to 
meaningfully participate in the decision-making process, it will provide 
substantial relief to individuals currently subjected to guardianship despite 
their ability to make their own decisions with help. Statutes should also 
establish the role of the State in training supporters and monitoring SDM 
agreements to ensure that these arrangements do not exploit or otherwise 
abuse the principal. By following these guidelines, legislatures may 
improve the quality of life of vulnerable populations and reinforce the right 
of adults to be the master of their own lives. 
Rachel Mattingly Phillips* 
 
* J.D. (2021), Washington Univesrity School of Law; B.A. (2011), Denison University. Many 
thanks to Professors Rebecca Dresser, Elizabeth Pendo, and Megan Wright for their valuable guidance 
and feedback. Thanks also to the Washington University Law Review team for their support in drafting 
and editing this Note. I dedicate this Note to my parents, whose journey with dementia inspired the 
questions that led me to this research. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss2/10
